We study whether clarity of central bank inflation reports affects return volatility in financial markets. We measure clarity of reports by the Czech National Bank, the European Central Bank, the Bank of England, and Sveriges Riksbank using the Flesch-Kincaid grade level, a standard readability measure. We find some evidence, mainly for the euro area, of a negative relationship between clarity and market volatility prior to and during the early stage of the global financial crisis. As the crisis unfolded, there is no longer robust evidence of a negative connection. We conclude that reducing noise using clear reports is possible but not without challenges, especially in times of crisis.
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Introduction
This paper studies whether greater clarity of central bank inflation reports leads to lower return volatility in financial markets and, if so, whether the global financial crisis affected the relationship between clarity and volatility.
Central banks have, over the recent decades, increasingly made use of communication. First, in using various types of communication channels, central banks are able to increase the transparency of their monetary policies. Second, in using communication actively, central banks are guiding expectations on inflation, the growth outlook, and future monetary policy decisions (Blinder, Ehrmann, Fratzscher, De Haan and Jansen 2008) .
By now, there is abundant evidence that communications by various central banks -such as the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, and the European Central Bank -are relevant for financial markets (Kohn and Sack 2004 , Ehrmann and Fratzscher 2007 , Rosa and Verga 2007 , Hayo and Neuenkirch 2010 , Lamla and Lein 2011 , Sturm and De Haan 2011 . At the same time, further insights on communication remain important as central banks continue their work on providing further accountability and transparency to the public (Yellen 2013 , Draghi 2014 , McKeown and Paterson 2014 .
Recent academic work has suggested that not necessarily only the quantity but also the quality of central bank communication is relevant. A number of papers focus on the benefits of clear communications. Blinder (2008) , for instance, suggests that clearer communications have higher signal-to-noise ratios and should thus provide more useful information. In evaluating inflation reports by twenty central banks, Fracasso, Genberg, and Wyplosz (2003) find that the perceived quality of the writing style negatively correlates with 2 monetary policy surprises -suggesting that clarity reduces uncertainty. For the Humphrey-Hawkins testimonies by the Federal Reserve Chairman, Jansen (2011) finds that greater clarity has gone hand in hand with lower volatility in markets for various financial instruments. Using a New-Keynesian framework, Tang and Yu (2011) show that clear central bank communication could lead to less volatile inflation and interest rate dynamics, which presumably implies lower volatility of prices in financial markets. Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2013) find that more consistent communication by members of monetary policy committees reduces uncertainty on the path of future interest rates.
However, the debate on the effects of clear communication is ongoing. Various papers have pointed to trade-offs and potential limits to transparency. The seminal work by Morris and Shin (2002) suggests that greater transparency on public policy is not necessarily welfare-enhancing. Van der Cruijsen, Eijffinger and Hoogduin (2010) find that there is an optimal intermediate degree of transparency. Finally, in surveying the literature on uncertainty, Bloom (2014) points to trade-offs by asking whether more transparent communication of public policy would indeed reduce uncertainty or whether transparency would introduce greater volatility as financial markets jump after policy pronouncements.
To further our understanding regarding the effects of clear communication, this paper uses inflation reports by four central banks to investigate the relationship between textual clarity and financial market volatility. We test whether clear communication indeed increases understanding and translates into more informed price formation on financial markets, less uncertainty, and lower levels of volatility.
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In the analysis, we pay special attention to the effects of communication during the recent global financial crisis. Disentangling cause and effect is far from straightforward, because communicating more clearly, while perhaps beneficial, also tends to be more challenging in financially volatile times. During the global financial crisis, many central banks have adjusted their use of communication, both in terms of content and channels. For instance, the fact that policy rates closed in on the zero-lower bound has led to the use of forward guidance (Swanson and Williams 2013; Moessner, De Haan, and Jansen 2014) . We analyse whether the crisis has affected the role of clarity in two ways. First, we include a crisis dummy variable in regressions of volatility on clarity measures. Second, we perform moving-window analyses.
Three recent papers have considered central bank communication during the crisis from a range of perspectives. Siklos (2013) uses DICTION, a software program for text analysis, to study the tone of communications by five central banks. He finds a greater focus on financial stability and also more attention for uncertainty concerning the economic outlook. Using various readability measures, Bulíř,Čihák and Jansen (2013) find that clarity of communications by a number of monetary authorities decreased during the financial crisis. Hayo, Kutan, and Neuenkirch (2014) analyse market reactions to Federal Reserve communication and find evidence that communications were more market relevant during the financial crisis.
Our paper adds to the growing, empirical literature on effects of communication clarity (Jansen 2011, Ehrmann and Fratzscher 2013 (Kincaid et al. 1975 ). The benefit of this measure is objectivity: the FK grade level is com- We then analyse measures of financial market volatility over a time window around the publication of inflation reports. We study the effects of clarity on the volatility of interest rates and stock market returns. This paper does not presuppose that any degree of market volatility is to be avoided. Indeed, in certain situations, clear communication is bound to be newsworthy and create volatility in line with its fundamental content -irrespective of the clarity of the document. Blinder et al. (2008, p. 912) In comparison to recent contributions (Jansen 2011, Ehrmann and Fratzscher 2013) , the empirical effects of clarity found in our study are estimated to be 5 small. We do find that when clarity of the reports is relevant, the effects are mostly beneficial. First, we find some evidence that prior to and during the early stages of the financial crisis, volatility of financial market returns was responsive to clarity of communication, that is more (less) clarity went hand in hand with lower (higher) levels of return volatility in financial markets.
Secondly, during the financial crisis, there is no broad indication that greater clarity of reports was associated with lower volatility of returns. Thirdly, we find that only in a few instances greater clarity went hand in hand with higher levels of volatility during the global financial crisis. Overall, we conclude that reducing noise in financial markets using clear inflation reports is possible but not without challenges, especially in times of crisis.
Methodology and data sources
The intuition for a negative relationship between clarity of communication and asset return volatility is as follows. If the central bank succeeds in formulating its views more clearly, agents would more easily understand the communications. Thus, financial analysts, investors, or traders could more readily grasp the central bank's policy positions and have more precise information on which to trade. By reducing uncertainty over the central bank's policies, leading to more informed price formation, increased clarity could thus lead to less return volatility.
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There are various elements of the inflation reports that contribute to overall 6 clarity, such as the text, the layout, and the information presented in charts and tables. Our approach is to use the variation in readability to identify potential effects on volatility. If it is difficult to read a text, the content is less likely to be understood. There is also an increased likelihood that the reader does not finish reading the text. Also, we choose to focus on the executive summaries of the reports rather than the full texts. The reason is that this part of the reports will have the greatest likelihood of being read. Therefore, the clarity of the executive summary is of key importance in informing market participants.
We follow a well-developed line of research (Flesch 1948 , Kibby 1975 ) that has identified text characteristics, such as lengths of words and sentences, as good predictors of readability. The most important benefit of these readability measures is that they are based on objective elements of the underlying texts.
Taking other elements of communication into account through content analysis would introduce a degree of subjectivity into the analysis (for further discussion, see Blinder et al. 2008 ).
We use the Flesch-Kincaid grade level (Kincaid et al. 1975 ) to measure (lack of) clarity. This variable expresses reading difficulty as the number of years of education needed to comprehend a text. To compute the FK grade level for a text written in English, one uses the following formula: For the European Central Bank, we use the editorial of the Monthly Bulletin.
We assess the effects of clarity on volatility of treasury bills, government bond yields and stock market returns. For yields on T-bills and government bonds, we use various maturities, ranging from overnight rates up to 5 year rates.
We also study the effect on stock market returns. To this end, we compute volatility for returns of the jurisdiction's main stock market index. We use 8 the PX index for the Czech Republic, the Eurostoxx50 index for the euro area, the OMX30 index for Sweden and the FTSE100 index for the United Kingdom.
(insert table 1 about here)
We follow the analysis in Jansen (2011) so that our results can be compared with the existing evidence.
2 First, we compute the standard deviation of either daily changes in yields or daily stock returns. We compute the standard deviations using ten days for the event windows. Finally, we take the natural logarithm of the standard deviations, which facilitates the interpretation of the estimations, so that the dependent variables are computed as:
where ln(σ post t ) denotes the volatility measures computed for the post-event windows, r t denotes the yield changes or returns on the day when the communication is made, and µ r denotes the averages for r t over the ten-day post-event window.
We estimate the effects of clarity using ten-day event windows. There can be various motives for choosing a comparatively long horizon for the event windows (Jansen 2011) . The most important factor is our goal of identifying the longer-term effects -if any -of communication. From an econometric perspective, using high-frequency data would be well suited to estimate the causal effects of clarity on volatility. But, from a policy perspective, one would hope that the effects of clarity reach beyond the hourly or daily event horizon 9 -at least to the extent that the effects of clarity are beneficial. One example in the literature is Fratzscher (2009) who finds that G7 communication has been able to affect exchange rates for horizons up to three months.
To identify the long-run effects of clarity, both before and during the financial crisis, we run the following regression for each of the four central banks:
where t is the day of the publication of the individual inflation reports, ln ( Including additional time dummies is not preferred given the limited number 3 During the period identified by the crisis dummy, central banks also engaged in unconventional monetary policies and issued forward guidance. We leave an analysis of the clarity of these policies for future work. See, for instance, Moessner, De Haan and Jansen (2014) for an analysis of the Riksbank's policies during the crisis.
of observations. More importantly, for each of the four central banks, there is no significant variation in clarity across months or weekdays. Finally, t is the error term, where we use the White (1980) approach in computing standard errors.
The estimations use only two control variables. The reason is that Bulíř, Cihák, and Jansen (2013) have only limited success in explaining variation in textual clarity of inflation reports across countries or over time using fundamental content. 4 Still, rather than treating variation in clarity in the current paper as exogenous, we include two variables that, in principle, could be important for the clarity of reports. First, we include pre-event volatility. The idea is that drafting a clear report is more challenging when the level of volatility is higher to begin with. Pre-event volatility is also a standard variable for earlier event studies (Clayton, Hartzell, and Rosenberg 2005, Dubofsky 1991).
Second, we control for the policy context in which the report was released. We do so by using the recent changes in the policy stance. The idea is that clarity will not be affected, if at all, while the policy stance does not change. Only when rates are changing could, perhaps, clarity change. A tightening or easing of the policy stance could coincide with less clarity if the changes are harder to explain, but could coincide with greater clarity when the central bank succeeds in its efforts of presenting a clear argument in the inflation report.
If clarity helps in reducing volatility in the years before the crisis, β F K will be estimated as greater than zero. This positive parameter would indicate that lower Flesch-Kincaid grade levels -indicating higher levels of clarity -coincide with lower levels of volatility. If clarity is helpful in reducing volatility during the crisis years, the sum of β F K and β F Kcrisis will be positive.
The estimated coefficients for clarity are useful to put the costs or gains of clarity in perspective. For instance, β F K measures the percentage change in volatility related to unit changes in the level of the Flesch-Kincaid grade level.
One could form an opinion on the desired level of clarity by comparing the costs of additional drafting of the inflation report to a potential gain in terms of reduced volatility. Table 2 gives summary statistics for the clarity of inflation reports and measures of financial market volatility. The four panels describe the Czech Republic, the euro area, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The columns show means, standard deviations, the 10th, 50th and 90th percentile, and the number of observations.
Data description
In all four cases, stock market volatility is higher than volatility of interest rates. Volatility levels in stock returns have been higher in Sweden and the euro area than in the Czech Republic and the United Kingdom. Volatility has generally been higher at the short end of the yield curve, the exception being the Czech Republic. The FK grade level statistics in the first row indicate quite some variation across countries, which may reflect that the original versions of the reports are written in different languages. The most relevant issue, also for the empirical analysis, are the changes over time rather than the cross-country differences. 
Estimation results
Tables 3 and 4 report parameter estimates for the coefficients β F K and β F Kcrisis in equation 3. Table 3 has results for the Czech Republic and the euro area; We use rolling-window regressions to further study the difference between non-crisis and crisis years for the case of the euro area. is a steady decline towards zero of the estimates for β F K . Third, an interesting change occurs in the middle period, as soon as the samples start to include some observations from the crisis period. There is an increase in the point estimates for β F K , both for the two-year and the three-year rate. Moreover, the point estimates are significantly different from zero at the 5% level. Overall, the findings indicate that volatility of government bond yields became more responsive to clarity of Monthly Bulletins during the early stages of the crisis, implying that more (less) clarity coincided with lower (higher) return volatility.
(insert figure 2 about here)
A final point is that for the crisis years, there are some indications of a positive relationship between clarity and volatility, meaning that clearer communications have gone hand in hand with higher levels of volatility. For Sweden, the sum of β F K and β F Kcrisis is negative for the one-year and the five-year maturity (table 4, 
